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This paper tackles the touchy question of atrocities committed by 
Ukrainians during the Second World War as a component, or rather its 
absence as a component, of the identity consciousness of the Ukrainian 
diaspora.1 The paper goes very much against the grain of that diaspora’s 
current consensus. In fact, I am trying to write here a text that is 
indigestible for that consensus, that is aimed at dissenting from it and 
creating a space for dissent. I have not conducted an exhaustive study of 
the relevant texts of the diaspora, but that is hardly necessary for a paper 
such as this. Instead, I have concentrated on current electronic media and 
recent years of The Ukrainian Weekly, supplemented with a retrospective 
sampling of articles from Svoboda2 and the volume on Ukrainian-Jewish 
relations that came out of an important conference held in 1983.3 
 
*** 
Anyone who consults the media, especially the electronic media, of the 
Ukrainian diaspora in North America cannot but be struck by how much 
attention it devotes to the issue of suspected war criminals.4 This has been 
going on for some time. The press, and Ukrainian-diaspora scholarship as 
well,5 followed with concern the workings of the Deschênes Commission, 
which was struck in 1985 to investigate war criminals in Canada. The 
press also closely followed the American and Israeli legal proceedings 
against Ukrainian-American John Demjanjuk, who was suspected of being 
the sadistic camp guard known as “Ivan the Terrible.” Diaspora press 
accounts depicted the trial as a travesty of justice. It has also portrayed 
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the search for war criminals more generally as a witch-hunt,6 harming 
almost exclusively innocent people and tarnishing the reputation of 
Ukrainians as a whole. There has been almost no attempt on the part of 
the Ukrainian diaspora to confront the issue of war criminality in a less 
defensive and more soul-searching manner. (The few exceptions will be 
mentioned below.) 
Instead, there persists a deafening silence about, as well as reluctance 
to confront, even well-documented war crimes, such as the mass murder of 
Poles in Volhynia by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)7 and the 
cooperation of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in the execution of the 
Jews.8 In his submission to the Deschênes Commission in 1986 John 
Sopinka, counsel for the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, stated that 
Ukrainian nationalist organizations “were not in any way allied with 
the Nazis.”9 It has also been denied that the Ukrainian movement in 
World War II had any ideological predisposition which could have 
facilitated participation in genocidal actions. UPA veteran and military 
historian Lev Shankovsky, for example, asserted at a round-table 
discussion that organized anti-Semitism “never existed in Ukraine. But 
there exists a myth about Ukrainian anti-Semitism” promoted by 
Moscow.10 
In the diaspora one frequently encounters a double standard in 
discussing war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by 
Ukrainians as opposed to those perpetrated against Ukrainians. Memoirs 
and eyewitness accounts, for example, are considered untrustworthy 
evidence for the former, but trustworthy for the latter; that is, Jewish or 
Polish first-hand accounts of Ukrainian war crimes are dismissed as 
biased, while an important Ukrainian victimization narrative, the famine 
of 1932-33, has relied primarily on just such eyewitness accounts.11 The 
argument is made that no order has ever been discovered instructing the 
UPA to kill Polish civilians in Volhynia.12 On the other hand, that the 
famine of 1932-33 was the result of deliberate policy is never questioned, 
even though this too remains without its “smoking gun” (as of course does 
the Jewish Holocaust). The crimes of Polish police in Nazi service are 
taken to provide some measure of explanation or justification for the 
attack on Polish villages in Volhynia,13 but never do Ukrainian diaspora 
authors suggest that Ukrainians should be held collectively responsible 
for the crimes of the Ukrainian police in German service. 
 




 Linked to the denial of war criminality, although also motivated by other 
factors, is the construction of Ukrainian victimization narratives.14 The 
most important of these concerns the famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-33, 
which Ukrainians in the diaspora frequently contrast and connect with 
the Holocaust.15 Yaroslav Bilinksy set out his position at the Ukrainian-
Jewish conference held in 1983, which happened to be the 50t h 
anniversary of the famine. Professor Bilinsky denied “a causal connection 
between alleged collaboration of Jewish-born Communists in the 
collectivization of agriculture and the Great Famine and any proven 
collaboration of Ukrainian-born extremists in the Holocaust.” Yet he 
maintained that “each community is bound to ask pointed questions about 
the share of guilt and that each national community may draw premature 
conclusions and erect stereotypes. To obviate the emergence and 
cultivation of dangerous stereotypes on the Ukrainian side, let us study 
the responsibility for the Great Famine as carefully as many Jews are 
studying the responsibility for the Holocaust. Both logically and morally, 
the two tragedies are equivalent. Genocide is genocide.”16 Later at the 
conference, in the round-table discussion, he made more explicit his view 
that Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust was to be understood in 
roughly the same terms as Jewish participation in the famine.17 
Victor Borisow, addressing a Famine-Genocide commemorative 
meeting in Bloomington in 2003 complained: “Many of us are pained by 
the realization that everyone on the planet knows about the Holocaust, 
but few have even heard about the Holodomor.” He identified two reasons 
for this: 1) “Hitler lost the war, Russia won the war.”  2) “Russia… has 
spent tons of money and decades of effort to slander and discredit 
anything and everything Ukrainian. Ukrainians, even those who still 
wear Nazi concentration camp tattoos on their arms, are routinely 
branded as Nazi sympathizers or collaborators, simply to discredit their 
message.” Borisow also linked the Ukrainian famine and Holocaust 
causally: “Although Hitler and Stalin hated each other, they also studied 
each other’s methods. When it was clear that Russia had gotten away 
with such massive genocide in Ukraine, Hitler felt free to proceed with the 
Holocaust.”18 
In an internet debate in the spring of 2002 the historian Mark Tauger 
denied that the Ukrainian famine was artificially contrived. Ukrainian-
diaspora scholars countered that this reflected “widespread double 
standards,” “a strong refusal among academics and journalists to place 
Soviet and Nazi crimes against humanity on the same level.” The 
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comparison was made to Holocaust denial.19 More recently a contributor 
to E-Poshta stated that for denying that the Ukrainian famine was 
genocide, Tauger as well as Lynne Viola and Moshe Lewin should be 
“relegated to hell’s dung heap of history reserved for the most morally 
bankrupt liars and propagandists.” To him, their views were of one cloth 
with those who claimed that “no one really died in the gas chambers at 
Auschwitz.”20 Tauger’s substantive argument, that the famine was in part 
generated by a change in the way Soviet authorities estimated harvest 
size,21 has not been confronted by diaspora scholars or publicists. 
Frequently diaspora authors urge fellow Ukrainians to follow the 
example of the Jews and produce a more detailed, more convincing 
narrative of their own holocaust. The claim is often made that the 
Ukrainians suffered as much as the Jews, indicating a competion in the 
intensity of victimization. From numerous examples, let me cite a few. At 
the same round-table discussion in 1960 where he denied the existence of 
Ukrainian anti-Semitism, Lev Shankovsky said: “The Jews should be an 
example for us of how to illuminate our recent tragic history.”22 In 1980, 
in a letter to Svoboda, Joseph Iwaniv asked: “Can we produce the names of 
the guilty and dates and places as readily as the Jews can when asked 
about the Holocaust?”23 Another author in Svoboda later that year 
declared: “The Ukrainian ‘Holocaust’ was no less terrible than the 
Holocaust of the Jews.”24 At the Ukrainian-Jewish conference of 1983 
Yaroslav Bilinsky spoke on this same topic: “We must finally write a 
basic history of Ukrainian martyrology, which would at the very least 
match in quality Hilberg’s work on the destruction of the Jews!”25 When 
in January 2000 Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko suggested 
that Ukraine might build a Holocaust museum,26 Lubomyr Luciuk wrote 
that Ukrainians instead needed “a national museum hallowing the memory 
of the many millions of Ukrainians murdered during the 20t h century… 
Ukrainians today need to be reminded of the great price their ancestors 
paid for independence, just as all Jews and official visitors remember 
when they visit Israel’s Yad Vashem.”27 
Other victimization narratives prominent in the diaspora include the 
internment of Ukrainians in Canada during World War I28 and the 
expulsion of Ukrainians from their home territories in southeastern 
Poland in 1947 (Akcja Wisła).29 
The Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association has opposed 
state support for the erection in Canada of a museum devoted exclusively 
to the Holocaust. The UCCLA’s Director of Research, Lubomyr Luciuk, 
formulated the objections thus: 
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No further federal, provincial, or municipal funding… should be 
provided for this project unless assurances are made, publicly, that the 
proposed Canadian Museum for Human Rights will be inclusive in its 
concept and contents. Will this museum, for example, host a permanent 
exhibit dealing with Canada’s first national internment operations and 
their traumatic consequences for Ukrainians and other Europeans 
unjustly imprisoned as ‘enemy aliens’ in 1914-1920? And will the 
proposed Holocaust Gallery hallow the memory of all victims of Nazi 
tyranny? What about the many millions more who suffered Communist 
oppression, whether they perished in the genocidal Great Famine of 
1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine… or in Pol Pot’s ‘killing fields’? Regardless 
of the undeniable generosity of those boosting this project, we must have 
confirmation, before the first shovel of earth is turned, that any such 
museum will not deliberately or otherwise elevate the suffering of any 
one community over others.30 
Before leaving this aspect of our topic, let me just explicitly clarify my 
position in the hopes that I can avoid at least some misunderstandings 
about it. I am not saying that the famine or the other components of the 
victimization narratives do not deserve historical research and reflection, 
nor that evil should be ignored, nor that the memory of the dead should not 
be held sacred. But I object to instrumentalizing this memory with the aim 
of generating political and moral capital, particularly when it is linked to 
an exclusion from historical research and reflection of events in which 
Ukrainians figured as perpetrators not victims, and when “our own” evil 
is kept invisible and the memory of the others’ dead is not held sacred. 
There is an analogy that, for all its faults, might be useful for me to invoke. 
I write here in much the same way as would a North American Jew who 
feels all the horror of the Holocaust, but who is disturbed to see this 
tragedy exploited to further the agenda of various identity and political 
projects (e.g., the defence of Israel), particularly when it is linked to an 
exculpating narrative (e.g., vis-à-vis the Palestinians).31 
 
*** 
The positions adopted by the Ukrainian diaspora have to be understood 
in context. The most articulate segment of the diaspora are the Western 
Ukrainians who left Ukraine after World War II, which is the target 
group for insinuations and accusations of war crimes, and particularly 
their descendents. The older cohort had witnessed the results of NKVD 
mass murders in the summer of 1939 and they were keenly aware of the 
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exhumation in Vinnytsia in 1943 of mass graves of murdered Soviet 
prisoners. They knew also of the brutal methods employed by the Soviets 
in their repression of UPA right after the war. Some of them had 
experience with murderous Nazi rule in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, 
and almost all knew someone whom the Germans had sent to a 
concentration camp for belonging to the Ukrainian underground. From 
their point of view, what was done to the Ukrainians was the primary 
narrative of the war.  
Furthermore, the Ukrainian diaspora has objected to what it considers 
to be uneven treatment of Nazi and Soviet crimes against humanity. They 
feel it is unfair that only Nazi and Nazi-associated criminals have been 
prosecuted for what they did in Ukraine and that no member of the former 
Soviet apparatus has been tried for murder. An example of what the 
diaspora finds galling is an article that appeared in the British Guardian 
and then was circulated by E-Poshta. The article described a certain 
Basya Chaika who, in the words of the Guardian correspondent, “was a 
zealous communist sitting on a military tribunal which dispensed 
execution orders for ‘traitors of the motherland’“ in Konotop, Ukraine in 
the 1940s. In Basya Chaika’s own words: “I was very radical and 
uncompromising… I had to sign death warrants more than once…” The 
Basya Chaika story was presented in the context of an internet project to 
recreate “life in the shtetls, the eastern European Jewish villages razed in 
the Holocaust.” As the E-Poshta commentator remarked, the journalist 
“seems to be oblivious of the fact that the subject of his article was an 
executioner of innocent people in Ukraine.”32 The Ukrainian Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association has called for an inquiry into Soviet war 
criminals in Canada and for the deportation of “those who lied about 
their criminal activities upon entering Canada.”33  
Finally, the Ukrainian diaspora has been put on the defensive by what 
it perceives to be slurs on Ukrainians as a whole in newspapers and 
television. Sensational articles about alleged “Nazi war criminals” 
appearing in the mainstream media are denounced, sometimes in 
intemperate terms (particularly in diaspora-Ukrainian electronic 
media).34 The diaspora reacted negatively to the 1980 made-for-TV movie 
“Holocaust” because it “depicted Ukrainians as Nazi collaborators 
rather than victims of the Third Reich.”35 Perhaps the most notorious case 
of misrepresentation of Ukrainians was the segment “The Ugly Face of 
Freedom” aired in 1994 on the CBS network program “60 Minutes.”36 
 




Although the denial of incidents of war criminality and a one-sided focus 
on Ukrainian victimization are prevalent in the Ukrainian community in 
North America, no community is monolithic, and there have been and are 
some exceptions to the rule.  
One was the late Ivan L. Rudnytsky, a scholar possessed of great civil 
courage. He questioned the view commonly accepted in diaspora 
historiography that the Bandera movement underwent a democratic 
transformation in the second half of 1943 and in 1944. He specifically 
criticized the xeonophobia of OUN, in particular its attitude toward the 
Jews during World War II and its “conscious campaign of  ‘cleansing the 
land’ of Polish population.”37 At the 1983 Ukrainian-Jewish conference, 
in response to Yaroslav Bilinsky’s call for Jewish scholars to examine 
Jewish participation in Stalinist crimes, Ivan Rudnytsky said: 
“Everybody should make some house cleaning first within his own group 
and it would be improper for Ukrainians to tell Jewish scholars what 
they have to do with Jewish history. This is their problem, but we should 
begin now to clean our own house, and we have not been good enough at 
it.”38 
Marco Carynnyk raised the question of wartime Ukrainian anti-
Semitism in what was then the most intellectually respectable journal of 
the diaspora, Suchasnist’.39 He has continued to work on this issue, both 
as a scholar40 and a creative writer (the unfinished “Furious Angels”). 
This stream in his oeuvre has made him unpopular in some circles. 
Sister Sophia Senyk has criticized the Greek Catholic church in 
Ukraine for its uncritical attitude towards UPA. In an article published in 
the journal of the Keston Institute, Religion, State & Society, she wrote: 
“While some of its members were no doubt idealistic freedom fighters, the 
UIA [= UPA] also has on its records numerous massacres of civilian 
population and burnings, just as Nazi and communist military formations 
do.” Excerpts from Sister Sophia Senyk’s article were circulated by E-
Poshta under the title “Vicious Attack on the Ukrainian Catholic 
Church.” The words previously cited were highlighted in bold.41  
I myself have also frankly discussed Ukrainian collaboration in the 
murder of Jews during World War II.42 
Occasionally, expressions of frustration with the dominant discourse 
appear in letters to The Ukrainian Weekly. Nicholas Sawicki expressed 
his reservations about a column by Myron Kuropas entitled “Holocaust 
Exploitation”; the title, he said, was “hardly appropriate for a 
newspaper of this standing.”43 George A. Nestor objected to some of the 
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newer terms being used for the famine, including “Famine-Genocide” and 
“Famine-Holocaust.” “Both words [Holocaust and Genocide] aptly apply 
to the catastrophe that befell European Jews during World War II. We 
should not be piggybacking off the Jews: it diminishes us both.”44 
 
*** 
The opening of Soviet archives makes it intellectually more difficult for the 
diaspora to remain in denial concerning war crimes perpetrated by 
Ukrainian militia and police in German service and Ukrainian nationalist 
units. A major study of the destruction of the Jews in Eastern Galicia 
documents the participation of Ukrainian police in the execution of 
Jews.45 There has also appeared a monograph specifically devoted to the 
Belarusian and Ukrainian police which provides a more detailed account 
of their criminal activities.46 UPA’s atrocities against civilians have been 
documented in riveting archivally based studies by Jeffrey Burds,47 and he 
is currently working on a book-length, revisionist study of UPA. 
Volodymyr Serhiichuk published a volume of documents on the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and UPA that was meant 
to cast the nationalists in a favorable light. Nonetheless he included a 
document from an UPA unit in Volhynia that reported on its annihilation 
of Polish villages in the spring of 1943.48 As more archival research is 
conducted, it is probable that more such information will come to light. Of 
course, the results of scholarly research are in most cases slow to be 
integrated into collective memory, but this is especially so when they are 
not easily accommodated into the existing narrative. 
It has also become more difficult to maintain the innocence of 
Ukrainian national ideology in light of recent research. It is now clear 
that Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia was already highly racialized in 
the late 19t h century49 and had developed an elaborate anti-Jewish 
discourse.50 Anti-Semitic articles appeared regularly in the interwar 
Western Ukrainian press.51 During the war OUN leader Yaroslav Stetsko 
expressed his support for German-style eliminationist anti-Semitism.52 As 
I have described elsewhere, in the spring of 1943 the best of the Ukrainian 
papers under German occupation, Krakivs’ki visti, was tasked with 
printing a series of original anti-Semitic articles. The paper was able to 
enlist some prominent figures, including several who were influential in 
North-American diaspora publications after the war: Anatol Kurdydyk, 
who edited Vil’ne slovo in Toronto and Novyi shliakh and Postup in 
Winnipeg; Luka Lutsiv, who for many years was an editor of Svoboda; 
Oleksandr Mokh, who ran the publishing house Dobra knyzhka out of 
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Toronto.53 Also, since the 1920s Western Ukrainian nationalism had 
promoted ruthlessness towards national enemies: enemies were to be 
destroyed not forgiven, and the strong were to crush the weak.54 Interwar 
and wartime Ukrainian nationalism was quite different from Nazism, but 




A painful yet honest assessment of Ukrainian participation in wartime 
atrocities is long overdue for the diaspora. A number of postwar societies 
have come to terms with the dark side of their wartime past, most notably 
the Germans and also, more recently, the French. The publication of Jan T. 
Gross’s Neighbors has touched off some self-examination in Poland about 
Polish attitudes and actions with regard to the Jews during and right after 
the war. Discussing Gross’s book, Janine P. Holc has written: “If a non-
Jewish Pole claims Chopin as part of her collective inheritance, she must 
also acknowledge significant acts of violence or brutality. For Gross, 
selecting only commendable deeds as part of one’s national identity is a 
facile act of self-indulgence and not a genuine engagement with one’s 
actual collective identity.”55 I would not go quite so far, but only because I 
distrust the conception of an “actual collective identity.” What I would 
say is that we need the construction of a more complex, more reflective, 
more difficult collective memory. Perhaps this is not for all, but there has 
to be a space created for those who want to maintain a relation to the 
Ukrainian identity but also want to move beyond a rhetoric of denial and 
victimization, a rhetoric sounding increasingly shrill and hollow. We 
need a healthier collective memory firmly rooted in truthfulness. 
Moreover, the Ukrainian diaspora has to reach out to and 
communicate with the other. Only soul-searching can open the door to 
reconciliation and to the elaboration of an understanding of the past that 
can be shared by Ukrainians, Jews and Poles. Otherwise the situation 
will remain as it is today, with several competing hermetic narratives of 
what happened during the war. The Ukrainian diaspora narrative, which 
had never been very convincing to outsiders, is becoming even less so. It is 
time to revise what we remember. 
 




E N D N O T E S  
1  I owe a debt of thanks to those who read and discussed a draft of this 
paper with me, not all of whom share my views: Chrystia Chomiak, 
David Marples, Alan Rutkowski, Sister Sophia Senyk, and Andriy 
Zayarnyuk. 
2  I am grateful to Taras Kurylo who surveyed Svoboda for 1950, 1960, 
1970, 1980. 
3  Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective, ed. Peter J. 
Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies, 1988). 
4  For example, on the website of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress 
(http://www.ucc.ca) one can find “Canada’s War Crimes Program 
1998-2001: Lesson Learned” and “Ukrainians during World War II.” 
Numerous press releases on war crimes can be found at the site of 
the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association 
(http://www.uccla.ca/pressreleases/warcrimes). E-Poshta 
regularly circulates material on war crimes, such as “War Crimes 
Report - Canada” 10 July 2001, “Canadian War-Crimes Process is a 
Farce and Insulting” 12 April 2002, “The Dispensing of Canadian 
Justice – Letter to Cabinet” 8 June 2002. 
5  Yury Boshyk, ed., Ukraine during World War II: History and Its 
Aftermath: A Symposium (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies, 1986). See especially Part II: History and Its 
Aftermath: Investigating War Criminals in Canada and the United 
States. 
6  For example: Lubomyr Luciuk, “Wasyl Odynsky a Victim of Modern-
Day Witch-Hunt,” Ukrainian Weekly, 25 March 2001.  Matthew T. 
Connolly, “Luciuk Commentary Much Appreciated,” Ukrainian 
Weekly, 13 May 2001. Other terminology can also be found: 
“...lobby-inspired show trials.” Eugene Harasymiw, “Letter to 
Edmonton Journal Regarding War Crimes Issue,” Ukrainian Weekly, 8 
October 2000. 
7  “We need a media watchdog that will monitor the press and 
distribute information and demand corrections. Just last week, a 
writer on the New York Daily News editorial board wrote an article 
which stated that during World War II, Ukrainians massacred Polish 
Catholics.” Roman Iwasiwka, “Yes, We Should Hire a PR Firm,” 




Ukrainian Weekly, 30 January 2000. Typical is a reference to “the 
commemoration of the so-called 1943 events in Volyn, during which 
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is accused of destroying Polish 
settlements and murdering from 30,000 to 60,000 Poles.” Emphasis 
added. Oksana Zakydalsky, “Commemorations of 1943 Events in 
Volyn: Perspective of Ukrainians in Poland,” Ukrainian Weekly, 8 
June 2003. “In 2003 Polish authorities are planning to make [sic] the 
anniversary of what they refer to as the ‘Slaughter in Volyn’ – the 
alleged killings of a large number of ethnic Poles by the Ukrainian 
underground in the Volyn region of Ukraine in 1943.” Emphasis 
added. “Treasure Trove of Ukrainain Historical Archives 
Discovered in Poland,” E-Poshta, 19 February 2003. 
8  For an eminent Ukrainian political scientist in the 1980s it was still 
a question whether Ukrainians “served only as guards or also shot 
the Jews.” Yaroslav Bilinsky, “Methodological Problems and 
Philosophical Issues in the Study of Jewish-Ukrainian Relations 
during the Second World War,” in Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, ed. 
Potichnyj and Aster, p. 380. On the denial of the culpability of the 
Ukrainian police, see: John-Paul Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration 
in the Extermination of the Jews During the Second World War: 
Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors,” in The Fate of 
the European Jews, 1939-1945: Continuity or Contingency, ed. 
Jonathan Frankel (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), Studies in Contemporary Jewry 13 (1997): 186 n. 11; also:  
9  “Ukrainians during World War II,” Ukrainian Canadian Congress 
position paper, 19 June 1999. 
10  “Pro problemu antysemityzmu v Ukraini,” Svoboda, 3 February 1960.  
11  Classic texts are: S.O. Pidhainy, et al., eds., The Black Deeds of the 
Kremlin: A White Book, vol. 1: Book of Testimonies (Toronto: 
Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Communist Terror, 
1953) and James E. Mace and Leonid Heretz, eds., Oral History 
Project of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine, 3 vols. (Washington: 
U.S. G.P.O., 1990). 
12  Taras Kuzio, “Commemorating 1943 Events in Volyn,” Kyiv Post, 10 
April 2003. Taras Kuzio, “How Poland is Commemorating the Volyn 
Events of 1943 the Wrong Way,” Ukrainian Weekly, 25 May 2003. 
13  This is rather cryptically put in Kuzio, “Commemorating 1943 
Events in Volyn.” Kuzio writes that “an important factor in the 
Volhynian conflict” was “when Ukrainian policemen who fled to 




the UPA were replaced by the Nazis with local Poles.” There is a 
similar statement in Zakydalsky, “Commemorations of 1943 events.” 
The actions of Poles in the Schutzmannschaften are the usual 
justification provided by Ukrainian nationalists for the attacks of 
UPA on the Polish civilian population. 
14  John Gregorovich, chairman of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association: “More often than not Ukrainians have been 
portrayed as villains rather than as the victims that they truly 
were.” “Holocaust Education Is Supported by Ukrainian Canadian 
Community,” Ukrainian Weekly, 31 October 1999. Historian Andreas 
Kappeler has noted that because of their 20th-century experience, 
Ukrainians have developed a martyrology that plays a large role in 
their national mythology. “But at the same time they sometimes forget 
that Ukrainians could be found not only among the victims, but also 
among the perpetrators of the totalitarian regimes.” Andreas 
Kappeler, Der schwierige Weg zur Nation: Beiträge zur neueren 
Geschichte der Ukraine (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003), p. 19.  
15  The issue of the famine was frequently raised by Ukrainian 
Americans in connection with the John Demjanjuk trial. Glenn 
Sharfman, “The Quest for Justice: The Reaction of the Ukrainian-
American Community to the John Demjanjuk Trials,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 2, no. 1 (2000): 68, 70, 78. “At a time when 
political leaders are… demanding reparation for Jewish Holocaust 
victims, those who died in the Ukrainian genocide are being ignored.” 
Maria Lewytzkyj, “Great Famine Commemoration Bears Witness to 
Genocide,” Ukrainian Weekly, 14 November 1999 (quoting 
Volodymyr Kurylo). “…the holocaust-famine.” George V. Mylton, 
“Books Expose Famine-Genocide,” Ukrainian Weekly, 8 October 
2000. “…the Ukrainian holocaust inflicted upon the Ukrainian 
people by the Soviet government during the artificially created Great 
Famine of 1932-1933.” Ihor Sawon, “Famine Memorial United Our 
Community,” Ukrainian Weekly, 3 December 2000. Comparing 
Ukrainian history textbooks written in Ukraine to the one by 
Toronto historian Orest Subtelny, a Swedish scholar wrote: “In 
none of the surveyed Ukrainian history textbooks is the conscious 
comparison between the Famine and the Holocaust prominent, as it 
was in the North American case. On the contrary, it is altogether 
absent, save in Orest Subtelny’s presentation of what the Famine 
represents for the Ukrainian community.” Johan Öhman, “From 




Famine to Forgotten Holocaust: The 1932-1933 Famine in Ukrianian 
Historical Cultures,” in Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander, eds., 
Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe 
(Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003), p. 242. 
16  Bilinsky, “Methodological Problems,” p. 387. 
17  “Round-Table Discussion,” in Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, ed. 
Potichnyj and Aster, p. 486. 
18  “Victor Borisow’s Keynote Address at Commemoration,” Ukrainian 
Weekly, 19 October 2003. 
19  Taras Kuzio, “Denial of Famine-Terror Continues Unabated,” 
RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report, 4, no. 23 (12 June 2002).  
20  Peter Borisow, “So-called Omissions in the Ukrainian Famine 
Bibliography,” E-Poshta, 22 May 2003. Borisow lumped these 
scholars together with pro-Soviet propagandists Douglas Tottle and 
Jeff Coplon. See the judicious comments of David Marples, “In 
Defence of the Ukrainian Famine Bibliography,” E-Poshta, 22 May 
2003. 
21  Mark B. Tauger, “The 1932 Harvest and the Soviet Famine of 1932-
1933,” Slavic Review 50, no. 1 (Spring 1991). 
22  “Pro problemu antysemityzmu v Ukraini.” 
23  Joseph Iwaniv, “Documentation of Our Holocaust Needed,” Svoboda, 
30 March 1980. 
24  L. Stakhniv-Diachenko, “Novyny z Ligy proty zneslavlennia 
ukrains’koho imeni,” Svoboda, 10 June 1980.  
25  Bilinsky, “Methodological Problems,” p. 387. See also “Round-Table 
Discussion,” p. 483. 
26  “Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko’s Address to Holocaust 
Conference,” Ukrainian Weekly, 19 March 2000. 
27  Lubomyr Luciuk, “Museum Must Recall All Who Were Killed,” 
Ukrainian Weekly, 16 April 2000. Another letter on the same issue 
opined: “One of the last things the world needs is yet another 
Holocaust museum. It is also the very last thing Ukraine needs.” 
Eugene Harasymiw, “Is Ukraine’s PM Merely Being PC?” Ukrainian 
weekly, 16 April 2000. 
28  The Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association was founded 
“in 1984 to meet the defamatory accusations that ‘Ukrainian war 
criminals’ were being harboured in Canada.” Later: “Mandated by 
the Ukrainian Canadian community to negotiate a timely and 
honourable Ukrainian Canadian Redress Settlement Agreement for 




the unjust internment of Ukrainian Canadians as ‘enemy aliens,’ 
UCCLA has organized symposia, submitted numerous articles to the 
Canadian and Ukrainian press and distributed educational 
materials widely…” http://www.uccla.ca/about/ (accessed 21 
May 2003). 
29  “Declaration of the Ukrainian World Congress on the Occasion of 
the 55th Anniversary of ‘Akcja Wisla’ in Poland,” 12 April 2002, 
archived in E-Poshta, 22 May 2002. 
30  “Museum Must Include All Victims,” letter to the editor, Winnipeg 
Free Press, 15 April 2003. 
31  It is appropriate at this juncture to quote Ukrainian Weekly’s 
columnist Myron Kuropas: “Certain Jewish American leaders are 
determined to keep the Holocaust alive in order to promote ‘guilt’… 
Sensing a great opportunity to elevate American consciousness of 
Jewish victimhood, other Jewish organizations, academics and 
individuals signed on. The Holocaust has since become big business. 
It keeps Jewish organizations financially solvent, produces countless 
books, articles and films, and it protects Israel from ever being 
perceived in an unattractive light.” There is no trace here of a 
reflection that his criticism of the practices he identifies among the 
Jews may also have some relevance to the Ukrainian diaspora. He 
does, though, link the Holocaust with the famine: “…The powerful 
Jewish lobby… has convinced many that the Holocaust was a 
uniquely Jewish event… To suggest that the destruction of 7 million 
Ukrainians by the Bolsheviks in the 1932-1933 famine in Soviet 
Ukraine was perhaps just as evil as the Holocaust is to dishonor in 
some grotesque way the murder of 6 million Jews by the Nazis.” 
Myron B. Kuropas, “The Demjanjuk Debacle Revisited,” Ukrainian 
Weekly, 3 March 2002. He had expressed similar ideas earlier: 
Myron B. Kuropas, “Manipulating the Holocaust,” Ukrainian 
Weekly, 5 September 1999. Myron B. Kuropas, “Holocaust 
Exploitation,” Ukrainian Weekly, 20 August 2000. 
32  “Guardian Article about a Jewish Communist ‘Hanging Judge’ in 
Ukraine,” E-Poshta, 7 January 2003. 
33  “Ukrainian Canadians Call for Inquiry on Soviet and Communist 
War Criminals in Canada,” UCCLA media release, 9 July 2002. 
34  In a letter dated 27 September 2002 and circulated on infoukes and E- 
Poshta, Will Zuzak referred to “the pimps in the news media, who 
have sold their souls to the Holocaust Industry.” 




35  “Strike While It’s Hot,” Svoboda, 27 April 1980. 
36  The Ukrainian Canadian Congress issued a detailed analysis of this 
segment: “‘The Ugly Face of Freedom’: A Position Paper.” See also: 
Terry Harasym, “60 Minutes: An Anti-Ukrainian Scandal,” 
Ukrainian Canadian Herald, December 1994, p. 8. 
37  Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyi, “Natsionalizm i totalitaryzm (Vidpovid’ 
M. Prokopovi),” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 7, no. 2 (13) (Fall 1982): 
83-85. 
38  “Round-Table Discussion,” p. 491. 
39  Marko Tsarynnyk, “Til’ky i iest’ u nas voroh – nashe sertse,” 
Suchasnist’, October 1984. 
40  Karel C. Berkhof and Marco Carynnyk, “The Organization of 
Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: 
Iaroslav Stets’ko’s 1941 Zhyttiepys,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 23, 
no. 3-4 (1999):149-84. 
41  Sister Sophia’s article originally appeared in Religion, State & 
Society 30, no. 4 (2002). The excerpts were circulated in E-Poshta of 
21 March 2003. E-Poshta was alerted to the article by Taras Kuzio. 
The e-mail address of the editor of Religion, State & Society was 
provided so that readers could express their views directly to him. 
42  Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration.” 
43  Nicholas Sawicki, “Ethnic Tensions and Wise Decisions,” Ukrainian 
Weekly, 3 September 2000. Kuropas’s article has been cited above. 
44  George A. Nestor, “Famine Terminology Is Problematic,” Ukrainian 
Weekly, 18 May 2003. 
45  Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 
1941-1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen 
Massenverbrechens (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997), pp. 148, 
217-19, 260, 366. 
46  Martin Dean, Collaboration during the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local 
Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-44 (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, published in association with the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, 2000). But see my reservations about this book in 
a review forthcoming in Polin. 
47  Jeffrey Burds, “AGENTURA: Soviet Informants’ Networks and the 
Ukrainian Rebel Underground in Galicia, 1944-1948,” East 
European Politics and Societies 11, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 89-130. 
Jeffrey Burds, “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-




1948,” Cahiers du Monde russe 42/2, no. 3-4 (April-December 2001): 
279-319. 
48  “In the village of Kuty, Shumsk raion, a whole Polish colony was 
burned down (86 households), and the population was destroyed for 
collaboration with the gestapo and German authorities… In Verba 
raion the Polish colony Nova Novytsia was burned down (40 
households) for collaboration with the German authorities. The 
population was destroyed… For active collaboration with the 
Germans in this same village [Bihal, Derazhne raion] the Polish 
colony was destroyed.” Volodymyr Serhiichuk, OUN-UPA v roky 
viiny. Novi dokumenty i materialy (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1996), pp. 311-12. 
See also I.I. Il’iushyn, OUN-UPA i ukrains’ke pytannia v roky druhoi 
svitovoi viiny (v svitli pol’s’kykh dokumentiv) (Kyiv: Natsional’na 
Akademiia Nauk Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 2000). 
49  Andriy Zayarnyuk, “Framing the Ukrainian Peasantry in Habsburg 
Galicia, 1846-1914 (With a Focus on the Sambir Area”( PhD thesis: 
University of Alberta, 2003), chapter 8. 
50  John-Paul Himka, “Ukrainian-Jewish Antagonism in the Galician 
Countryside during the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Ukrainian-
Jewish Relations, ed. Potichnyj and Aster, pp. 111-58. 
51  Shimon Redlich, “Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Inter-War Poland 
as Reflected in Some Ukrainian Publications,” Polin 11 (1998): 232-
46. 
52  Berkhof and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews.”  
53  John-Paul Himka, “Krakivski visti and the Jews, 1943: A 
Contribution to the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during 
the Second World War,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 21, no. 1-2 
(Summer-Winter 1996): 81-95. I refrained from naming Anatol 
Kurdydyk in that article because he was then still alive. (See p. 88.) 
An obituary of Kurdydyk appeared in Ukrainian Weekly on 15 July 
2001and a warm appreciation by R.L. Chomiak on 2 September 2001. 
54  Janusz Radziejowski, “Kształtowanie się oblicza ideowego 
radykalnego nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego (1917-1929),” in Ewa 
Grześkowiak-Turczyk, Polska - Polacy - mniejszości narodowe 
(Wrocław: 1992), pp. 317-18. 
55  Janine P. Holc, “Working through Jan Gross’s Neighbors,” Slavic 
Review 61, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 465. 
